CVE-2025-37889

ASoC: ops: Consistently treat platform_max as control value

Published May 9, 2025 CVSS 3.1 · 5.5 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ASoC: ops: Consistently treat platform_max as control value

This reverts commit 9bdd10d57a88 ("ASoC: ops: Shift tested values in
snd_soc_put_volsw() by +min"), and makes some additional related
updates.

There are two ways the platform_max could be interpreted; the maximum
register value, or the maximum value the control can be set to. The
patch moved from treating the value as a control value to a register
one. When the patch was applied it was technically correct as
snd_soc_limit_volume() also used the register interpretation. However,
even then most of the other usages treated platform_max as a
control value, and snd_soc_limit_volume() has since been updated to
also do so in commit fb9ad24485087 ("ASoC: ops: add correct range
check for limiting volume"). That patch however, missed updating
snd_soc_put_volsw() back to the control interpretation, and fixing
snd_soc_info_volsw_range(). The control interpretation makes more
sense as limiting is typically done from the machine driver, so it is
appropriate to use the customer facing representation rather than the
internal codec representation. Update all the code to consistently use
this interpretation of platform_max.

Finally, also add some comments to the soc_mixer_control struct to
hopefully avoid further patches switching between the two approaches.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record

Tracking

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Advisories

Source ID Title
Debian DLA Debian DLA DLA-4193-1 linux-6.1 security update
EUVD EUVD EUVD-2025-14101 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: ops: Consistently treat platform_max as control value This reverts commit 9bdd10d57a88 ("ASoC: ops: Shift tested values in snd_soc_put_volsw() by +min"), and makes some additional related updates. There are two ways the platform_max could be interpreted; the maximum register value, or the maximum value the control can be set to. The patch moved from treating the value as a control value to a register one. When the patch was applied it was technically correct as snd_soc_limit_volume() also used the register interpretation. However, even then most of the other usages treated platform_max as a control value, and snd_soc_limit_volume() has since been updated to also do so in commit fb9ad24485087 ("ASoC: ops: add correct range check for limiting volume"). That patch however, missed updating snd_soc_put_volsw() back to the control interpretation, and fixing snd_soc_info_volsw_range(). The control interpretation makes more sense as limiting is typically done from the machine driver, so it is appropriate to use the customer facing representation rather than the internal codec representation. Update all the code to consistently use this interpretation of platform_max. Finally, also add some comments to the soc_mixer_control struct to hopefully avoid further patches switching between the two approaches.
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7591-1 Linux kernel vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7591-2 Linux kernel (FIPS) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7591-3 Linux kernel (Real-time) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7591-4 Linux kernel (AWS) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7591-5 Linux kernel (Intel IoTG) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7591-6 Linux kernel (Raspberry Pi) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7592-1 Linux kernel vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7593-1 Linux kernel (HWE) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7597-1 Linux kernel (Azure) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7597-2 Linux kernel (Azure FIPS) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7598-1 Linux kernel (Azure) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7602-1 Linux kernel (Xilinx ZynqMP) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7605-1 Linux kernel vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7605-2 Linux kernel (Low Latency) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7606-1 Linux kernel (OEM) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7628-1 Linux kernel (Azure) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7655-1 Linux kernel (Intel IoTG) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7764-1 Linux kernel vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7764-2 Linux kernel (HWE) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7765-1 Linux kernel (NVIDIA) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7766-1 Linux kernel vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7767-1 Linux kernel (Real-time) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7767-2 Linux kernel (Real-time) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7779-1 Linux kernel (IBM) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7790-1 Linux kernel (Raspberry Pi) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7800-1 Linux kernel (Raspberry Pi Real-time) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7801-1 Linux kernel (HWE) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7802-1 Linux kernel (Azure) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7801-2 Linux kernel (Oracle) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7809-1 Linux kernel (Azure, N-Series) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7801-3 Linux kernel (Oracle) vulnerabilities
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Debian
Debian debian Linux
Linux
Linux linux Kernel
Weaknesses NVD-CWE-noinfo
CPEs cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:11.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.14:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*
cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.14:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*
cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.14:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*
cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.14:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*
cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.14:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*
cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.14:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*
cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.7:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.7:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*
cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.7:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*
cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.7:rc7:*:*:*:*:*:*
cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.7:rc8:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Debian
Debian debian Linux
Linux
Linux linux Kernel
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics epss

{'score': 0.00035}

epss

{'score': 0.00036}

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-20
Type Values Removed Values Added
References
Metrics threat_severity

None

cvssV3_1

{'score': 5.5, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H'}

threat_severity

Moderate

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: PCI/MSI: Handle the NOMASK flag correctly for all PCI/MSI backends The conversion of the XEN specific global variable pci_msi_ignore_mask to a MSI domain flag, missed the facts that: 1) Legacy architectures do not provide a interrupt domain 2) Parent MSI domains do not necessarily have a domain info attached Both cases result in an unconditional NULL pointer dereference. This was unfortunatly missed in review and testing revealed it late. Cure this by using the existing pci_msi_domain_supports() helper, which handles all possible cases correctly. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: ops: Consistently treat platform_max as control value This reverts commit 9bdd10d57a88 ("ASoC: ops: Shift tested values in snd_soc_put_volsw() by +min"), and makes some additional related updates. There are two ways the platform_max could be interpreted; the maximum register value, or the maximum value the control can be set to. The patch moved from treating the value as a control value to a register one. When the patch was applied it was technically correct as snd_soc_limit_volume() also used the register interpretation. However, even then most of the other usages treated platform_max as a control value, and snd_soc_limit_volume() has since been updated to also do so in commit fb9ad24485087 ("ASoC: ops: add correct range check for limiting volume"). That patch however, missed updating snd_soc_put_volsw() back to the control interpretation, and fixing snd_soc_info_volsw_range(). The control interpretation makes more sense as limiting is typically done from the machine driver, so it is appropriate to use the customer facing representation rather than the internal codec representation. Update all the code to consistently use this interpretation of platform_max. Finally, also add some comments to the soc_mixer_control struct to hopefully avoid further patches switching between the two approaches.
Title PCI/MSI: Handle the NOMASK flag correctly for all PCI/MSI backends ASoC: ops: Consistently treat platform_max as control value
References
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: PCI/MSI: Handle the NOMASK flag correctly for all PCI/MSI backends The conversion of the XEN specific global variable pci_msi_ignore_mask to a MSI domain flag, missed the facts that: 1) Legacy architectures do not provide a interrupt domain 2) Parent MSI domains do not necessarily have a domain info attached Both cases result in an unconditional NULL pointer dereference. This was unfortunatly missed in review and testing revealed it late. Cure this by using the existing pci_msi_domain_supports() helper, which handles all possible cases correctly.
Title PCI/MSI: Handle the NOMASK flag correctly for all PCI/MSI backends
References
Weaknesses

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
Linux
Published
Updated
Nov 5, 2026, 8:52 PM
Reserved
Apr 16, 2025, 4:51 AM
Status
Analyzed
Published
May 9, 2025, 7:16 AM
Modified
Nov 5, 2026, 9:17 PM
Severity
Moderate
Public date
May 10, 2025, 12:00 AM