MQTT implementation in Sungrow iSolarCloud allowed users to subscribe to all data of all connected inverters
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
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| SunGrow | iSolarCloud | unaffected |
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No data available yet.
Vendor Solution
iSolarCloud has been patched by SunGrow and the vulnerability is no longer exploitable.
| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
EUVD |
EUVD-2025-18091 | SunGrow's back end users system iSolarCloud https://isolarcloud.com uses an MQTT service to transport data from the user's connected devices to the user's web browser. The MQTT server however did not have sufficient restrictions in place to limit the topics that a user could subscribe to. While the data that is transmitted through the MQTT server is encrypted and the credentials for the MQTT server are obtained though an API call, the credentials could be used to subscribe to any topic and the encryption key can be used to decrypt all messages received. An attack with an account on iSolarCloud.com could extract MQTT credentials and the decryption key from the browser and then use an external program to subscribe to the topic '#' and thus recieve all messages from all connected devices. |
No CVSS v3.1
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.265% probability within 30 days)
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epss
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epss
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ssvc
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| Description | SunGrow's back end users system iSolarCloud https://isolarcloud.com uses an MQTT service to transport data from the user's connected devices to the user's web browser. The MQTT server however did not have sufficient restrictions in place to limit the topics that a user could subscribe to. While the data that is transmitted through the MQTT server is encrypted and the credentials for the MQTT server are obtained though an API call, the credentials could be used to subscribe to any topic and the encryption key can be used to decrypt all messages received. An attack with an account on iSolarCloud.com could extract MQTT credentials and the decryption key from the browser and then use an external program to subscribe to the topic '#' and thus recieve all messages from all connected devices. | |
| Title | MQTT implementation in Sungrow iSolarCloud allowed users to subscribe to all data of all connected inverters | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-862 | |
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| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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