CVE-2025-21834

seccomp: passthrough uretprobe systemcall without filtering

Published Mar 6, 2025 CVSS 3.1 · 5.5 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

seccomp: passthrough uretprobe systemcall without filtering

When attaching uretprobes to processes running inside docker, the attached
process is segfaulted when encountering the retprobe.

The reason is that now that uretprobe is a system call the default seccomp
filters in docker block it as they only allow a specific set of known
syscalls. This is true for other userspace applications which use seccomp
to control their syscall surface.

Since uretprobe is a "kernel implementation detail" system call which is
not used by userspace application code directly, it is impractical and
there's very little point in forcing all userspace applications to
explicitly allow it in order to avoid crashing tracked processes.

Pass this systemcall through seccomp without depending on configuration.

Note: uretprobe is currently only x86_64 and isn't expected to ever be
supported in i386.

[kees: minimized changes for easier backporting, tweaked commit log]

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record

Tracking

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Advisories

Source ID Title
EUVD EUVD EUVD-2025-6211 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: seccomp: passthrough uretprobe systemcall without filtering When attaching uretprobes to processes running inside docker, the attached process is segfaulted when encountering the retprobe. The reason is that now that uretprobe is a system call the default seccomp filters in docker block it as they only allow a specific set of known syscalls. This is true for other userspace applications which use seccomp to control their syscall surface. Since uretprobe is a "kernel implementation detail" system call which is not used by userspace application code directly, it is impractical and there's very little point in forcing all userspace applications to explicitly allow it in order to avoid crashing tracked processes. Pass this systemcall through seccomp without depending on configuration. Note: uretprobe is currently only x86_64 and isn't expected to ever be supported in i386. [kees: minimized changes for easier backporting, tweaked commit log]
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7379-1 Linux kernel vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7379-2 Linux kernel (Raspberry Pi) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7380-1 Linux kernel (Low Latency) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7381-1 Linux kernel (Low Latency) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7382-1 Linux kernel (OEM) vulnerabilities
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Linux
Linux linux Kernel
Weaknesses NVD-CWE-noinfo
CPEs cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.14:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Linux
Linux linux Kernel
Type Values Removed Values Added
References
Metrics threat_severity

None

cvssV3_1

{'score': 5.5, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H'}

threat_severity

Low

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: seccomp: passthrough uretprobe systemcall without filtering When attaching uretprobes to processes running inside docker, the attached process is segfaulted when encountering the retprobe. The reason is that now that uretprobe is a system call the default seccomp filters in docker block it as they only allow a specific set of known syscalls. This is true for other userspace applications which use seccomp to control their syscall surface. Since uretprobe is a "kernel implementation detail" system call which is not used by userspace application code directly, it is impractical and there's very little point in forcing all userspace applications to explicitly allow it in order to avoid crashing tracked processes. Pass this systemcall through seccomp without depending on configuration. Note: uretprobe is currently only x86_64 and isn't expected to ever be supported in i386. [kees: minimized changes for easier backporting, tweaked commit log]
Title seccomp: passthrough uretprobe systemcall without filtering
References
Weaknesses

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
Linux
Published
Updated
May 11, 2026, 9:07 PM
Reserved
Dec 29, 2024, 8:45 AM
Status
Analyzed
Published
Mar 6, 2025, 5:15 PM
Modified
Jun 17, 2026, 8:44 AM
Severity
Low
Public date
Mar 6, 2025, 12:00 AM