CVE-2025-15574

{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2025-15574", "assignerOrgId": "551230f0-3615-47bd-b7cc-93e92e730bbf", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "SEC-VLab", "dateReserved": "2026-02-09T09:43:51.017Z", "datePublished": "2026-02-12T10:58:29.373Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-02-12T15:15:45.817Z"}, "containers": {"cna": {"affected": [{"defaultStatus": "unaffected", "product": "Pocket WiFi 3.0", "vendor": "SolaX Power", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "<3.022.03"}]}, {"defaultStatus": "unaffected", "product": "Pocket WiFi+LAN", "vendor": "SolaX Power", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "<1.009.02"}]}, {"defaultStatus": "unaffected", "product": "Pocket WiFi+4GM", "vendor": "SolaX Power", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "<1.005.05"}]}, {"defaultStatus": "unaffected", "product": "Pocket WiFi+LAN 2.0", "vendor": "SolaX Power", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "<006.06"}]}, {"defaultStatus": "unaffected", "product": "Pocket WiFi 4.0", "vendor": "SolaX Power", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "<003.03"}]}], "credits": [{"lang": "en", "type": "finder", "value": "Stefan Viehb\u00f6ck, SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab"}], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "supportingMedia": [{"base64": false, "type": "text/html", "value": "When connecting to the Solax Cloud MQTT server the username is the \"registration number\", which is the 10 character string printed on the SolaX Power Pocket device / the QR code on the device. The password is derived from the \"registration number\" using a proprietary XOR/transposition algorithm. Attackers with the knowledge of the registration numbers can connect to the MQTT server and impersonate the dongle / inverters.<br>"}], "value": "When connecting to the Solax Cloud MQTT server the username is the \"registration number\", which is the 10 character string printed on the SolaX Power Pocket device / the QR code on the device. The password is derived from the \"registration number\" using a proprietary XOR/transposition algorithm. Attackers with the knowledge of the registration numbers can connect to the MQTT server and impersonate the dongle / inverters."}], "impacts": [{"capecId": "CAPEC-21", "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CAPEC-21 Exploitation of Trusted Identifiers"}]}], "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"cweId": "CWE-330", "description": "CWE-330 Use of Insufficiently Random Values", "lang": "en", "type": "CWE"}]}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "551230f0-3615-47bd-b7cc-93e92e730bbf", "shortName": "SEC-VLab", "dateUpdated": "2026-02-12T10:58:29.373Z"}, "references": [{"url": "https://r.sec-consult.com/solax"}], "solutions": [{"lang": "en", "supportingMedia": [{"base64": false, "type": "text/html", "value": "The vendor provides patches for the affected Pocket models which can be obtained throw their customer's Solax Cloud account and using the Pocket firmware upgrade function there.<br><br>As of February 10, 2026, the firmware versions for each affected Pocket model are as follows according to the vendor:<br>1. Pocket WiFi 3.0 \u2013 (3.022.03)<br>2. Pocket WiFi+LAN \u2013 (1.009.02)<br>3. Pocket WiFi+4GM \u2013 (1.005.05)<br>4. Pocket WiFi+LAN 2.0 \u2013 (006.06)<br>5. Pocket WiFi 4.0 \u2013 (003.03)<br><br>The vendor provided the following further information regarding EV Charger and Adapter Box:<br>1. EV Charger: The WiFi module firmware supports digital signature, but only one-way authentication is implemented.<br>2. Adapter Box: The WiFi module firmware supports two-way authentication and digital signature.<br>"}], "value": "The vendor provides patches for the affected Pocket models which can be obtained throw their customer's Solax Cloud account and using the Pocket firmware upgrade function there.\n\nAs of February 10, 2026, the firmware versions for each affected Pocket model are as follows according to the vendor:\n1. Pocket WiFi 3.0 \u2013 (3.022.03)\n2. Pocket WiFi+LAN \u2013 (1.009.02)\n3. Pocket WiFi+4GM \u2013 (1.005.05)\n4. Pocket WiFi+LAN 2.0 \u2013 (006.06)\n5. Pocket WiFi 4.0 \u2013 (003.03)\n\nThe vendor provided the following further information regarding EV Charger and Adapter Box:\n1. EV Charger: The WiFi module firmware supports digital signature, but only one-way authentication is implemented.\n2. Adapter Box: The WiFi module firmware supports two-way authentication and digital signature."}], "source": {"discovery": "EXTERNAL"}, "title": "Insecure Credential Generation for Solax Power Pocket WiFi models MQTT Cloud Connection", "x_generator": {"engine": "Vulnogram 0.5.0"}}, "adp": [{"metrics": [{"cvssV3_1": {"scope": "UNCHANGED", "version": "3.1", "baseScore": 6.5, "attackVector": "NETWORK", "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N", "integrityImpact": "LOW", "userInteraction": "NONE", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "confidentialityImpact": "LOW"}}, {"other": {"type": "ssvc", "content": {"timestamp": "2026-02-12T15:15:40.976873Z", "id": "CVE-2025-15574", "options": [{"Exploitation": "none"}, {"Automatable": "yes"}, {"Technical Impact": "partial"}], "role": "CISA Coordinator", "version": "2.0.3"}}}], "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment", "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "shortName": "CISA-ADP", "dateUpdated": "2026-02-12T15:15:45.817Z"}}]}}

{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "containers": {"adp": [{"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment", "metrics": [{"cvssV3_1": {"scope": "UNCHANGED", "version": "3.1", "baseScore": 6.5, "attackVector": "NETWORK", "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N", "integrityImpact": "LOW", "userInteraction": "NONE", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "confidentialityImpact": "LOW"}}, {"other": {"type": "ssvc", "content": {"id": "CVE-2025-15574", "role": "CISA Coordinator", "options": [{"Exploitation": "none"}, {"Automatable": "yes"}, {"Technical Impact": "partial"}], "version": "2.0.3", "timestamp": "2026-02-12T15:15:40.976873Z"}}}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "shortName": "CISA-ADP", "dateUpdated": "2026-02-12T15:15:34.044Z"}}], "cna": {"title": "Insecure Credential Generation for Solax Power Pocket WiFi models MQTT Cloud Connection", "source": {"discovery": "EXTERNAL"}, "credits": [{"lang": "en", "type": "finder", "value": "Stefan Viehb\u00f6ck, SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab"}], "impacts": [{"capecId": "CAPEC-21", "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CAPEC-21 Exploitation of Trusted Identifiers"}]}], "affected": [{"vendor": "SolaX Power", "product": "Pocket WiFi 3.0", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "<3.022.03"}], "defaultStatus": "unaffected"}, {"vendor": "SolaX Power", "product": "Pocket WiFi+LAN", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "<1.009.02"}], "defaultStatus": "unaffected"}, {"vendor": "SolaX Power", "product": "Pocket WiFi+4GM", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "<1.005.05"}], "defaultStatus": "unaffected"}, {"vendor": "SolaX Power", "product": "Pocket WiFi+LAN 2.0", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "<006.06"}], "defaultStatus": "unaffected"}, {"vendor": "SolaX Power", "product": "Pocket WiFi 4.0", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "<003.03"}], "defaultStatus": "unaffected"}], "solutions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "The vendor provides patches for the affected Pocket models which can be obtained throw their customer's Solax Cloud account and using the Pocket firmware upgrade function there.\n\nAs of February 10, 2026, the firmware versions for each affected Pocket model are as follows according to the vendor:\n1. Pocket WiFi 3.0 \u2013 (3.022.03)\n2. Pocket WiFi+LAN \u2013 (1.009.02)\n3. Pocket WiFi+4GM \u2013 (1.005.05)\n4. Pocket WiFi+LAN 2.0 \u2013 (006.06)\n5. Pocket WiFi 4.0 \u2013 (003.03)\n\nThe vendor provided the following further information regarding EV Charger and Adapter Box:\n1. EV Charger: The WiFi module firmware supports digital signature, but only one-way authentication is implemented.\n2. Adapter Box: The WiFi module firmware supports two-way authentication and digital signature.", "supportingMedia": [{"type": "text/html", "value": "The vendor provides patches for the affected Pocket models which can be obtained throw their customer's Solax Cloud account and using the Pocket firmware upgrade function there.<br><br>As of February 10, 2026, the firmware versions for each affected Pocket model are as follows according to the vendor:<br>1. Pocket WiFi 3.0 \u2013 (3.022.03)<br>2. Pocket WiFi+LAN \u2013 (1.009.02)<br>3. Pocket WiFi+4GM \u2013 (1.005.05)<br>4. Pocket WiFi+LAN 2.0 \u2013 (006.06)<br>5. Pocket WiFi 4.0 \u2013 (003.03)<br><br>The vendor provided the following further information regarding EV Charger and Adapter Box:<br>1. EV Charger: The WiFi module firmware supports digital signature, but only one-way authentication is implemented.<br>2. Adapter Box: The WiFi module firmware supports two-way authentication and digital signature.<br>", "base64": false}]}], "references": [{"url": "https://r.sec-consult.com/solax"}], "x_generator": {"engine": "Vulnogram 0.5.0"}, "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "When connecting to the Solax Cloud MQTT server the username is the \"registration number\", which is the 10 character string printed on the SolaX Power Pocket device / the QR code on the device. The password is derived from the \"registration number\" using a proprietary XOR/transposition algorithm. Attackers with the knowledge of the registration numbers can connect to the MQTT server and impersonate the dongle / inverters.", "supportingMedia": [{"type": "text/html", "value": "When connecting to the Solax Cloud MQTT server the username is the \"registration number\", which is the 10 character string printed on the SolaX Power Pocket device / the QR code on the device. The password is derived from the \"registration number\" using a proprietary XOR/transposition algorithm. Attackers with the knowledge of the registration numbers can connect to the MQTT server and impersonate the dongle / inverters.<br>", "base64": false}]}], "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "type": "CWE", "cweId": "CWE-330", "description": "CWE-330 Use of Insufficiently Random Values"}]}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "551230f0-3615-47bd-b7cc-93e92e730bbf", "shortName": "SEC-VLab", "dateUpdated": "2026-02-12T10:58:29.373Z"}}}, "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2025-15574", "state": "PUBLISHED", "dateUpdated": "2026-02-12T15:15:45.817Z", "dateReserved": "2026-02-09T09:43:51.017Z", "assignerOrgId": "551230f0-3615-47bd-b7cc-93e92e730bbf", "datePublished": "2026-02-12T10:58:29.373Z", "assignerShortName": "SEC-VLab"}, "dataVersion": "5.2"}

{"affected": [{"affectedData": [{"defaultStatus": "unaffected", "product": "Pocket WiFi 3.0", "vendor": "SolaX Power", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "<3.022.03"}]}, {"defaultStatus": "unaffected", "product": "Pocket WiFi+LAN", "vendor": "SolaX Power", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "<1.009.02"}]}, {"defaultStatus": "unaffected", "product": "Pocket WiFi+4GM", "vendor": "SolaX Power", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "<1.005.05"}]}, {"defaultStatus": "unaffected", "product": "Pocket WiFi+LAN 2.0", "vendor": "SolaX Power", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "<006.06"}]}, {"defaultStatus": "unaffected", "product": "Pocket WiFi 4.0", "vendor": "SolaX Power", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "<003.03"}]}], "source": "551230f0-3615-47bd-b7cc-93e92e730bbf"}], "cveTags": [], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "When connecting to the Solax Cloud MQTT server the username is the \"registration number\", which is the 10 character string printed on the SolaX Power Pocket device / the QR code on the device. The password is derived from the \"registration number\" using a proprietary XOR/transposition algorithm. Attackers with the knowledge of the registration numbers can connect to the MQTT server and impersonate the dongle / inverters."}, {"lang": "es", "value": "Al conectarse al servidor MQTT de Solax Cloud, el nombre de usuario es el 'n\u00famero de registro', que es la cadena de 10 caracteres impresa en el dispositivo SolaX Power Pocket / el c\u00f3digo QR del dispositivo. La contrase\u00f1a se deriva del 'n\u00famero de registro' utilizando un algoritmo propietario de XOR/transposici\u00f3n. Atacantes con conocimiento de los n\u00fameros de registro pueden conectarse al servidor MQTT e suplantar el dongle / los inversores."}], "id": "CVE-2025-15574", "lastModified": "2026-06-17T08:38:03.540", "metrics": {"cvssMetricV31": [{"cvssData": {"attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "baseScore": 6.5, "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "LOW", "integrityImpact": "LOW", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "userInteraction": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N", "version": "3.1"}, "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "impactScore": 2.5, "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "type": "Secondary"}], "ssvcV203": [{"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "ssvcData": {"id": "CVE-2025-15574", "options": [{"exploitation": "none"}, {"automatable": "yes"}, {"technicalImpact": "partial"}], "role": "CISA Coordinator", "timestamp": "2026-02-12T15:15:40.976873Z", "version": "2.0.3"}}]}, "published": "2026-02-12T11:15:49.117", "references": [{"source": "551230f0-3615-47bd-b7cc-93e92e730bbf", "url": "https://r.sec-consult.com/solax"}], "sourceIdentifier": "551230f0-3615-47bd-b7cc-93e92e730bbf", "vulnStatus": "Deferred", "weaknesses": [{"description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-330"}], "source": "551230f0-3615-47bd-b7cc-93e92e730bbf", "type": "Secondary"}]}

{}

{"created": "2026-02-12T12:22:37.236441+00:00", "updated": "2026-02-12T12:22:37.236544+00:00", "vendors": ["solax", "solax$PRODUCT$pocket_wifi_3", "solax_power", "solax_power$PRODUCT$pocket_wifi+4gm", "solax_power$PRODUCT$pocket_wifi+lan", "solax_power$PRODUCT$pocket_wifi+lan_2.0", "solax_power$PRODUCT$pocket_wifi_4.0"]}