CVE-2024-45337

Misuse of connection.serverAuthenticate may cause authorization bypass in golang.org/x/crypto

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Published Dec 11, 2024 CVSS 3.1 · 9.1 Critical EPSS 3.8% KEV · Not listed
Description
Applications and libraries which misuse connection.serverAuthenticate (via callback field ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback) may be susceptible to an authorization bypass. The documentation for ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback says that "A call to this function does not guarantee that the key offered is in fact used to authenticate." Specifically, the SSH protocol allows clients to inquire about whether a public key is acceptable before proving control of the corresponding private key. PublicKeyCallback may be called with multiple keys, and the order in which the keys were provided cannot be used to infer which key the client successfully authenticated with, if any. Some applications, which store the key(s) passed to PublicKeyCallback (or derived information) and make security relevant determinations based on it once the connection is established, may make incorrect assumptions. For example, an attacker may send public keys A and B, and then authenticate with A. PublicKeyCallback would be called only twice, first with A and then with B. A vulnerable application may then make authorization decisions based on key B for which the attacker does not actually control the private key. Since this API is widely misused, as a partial mitigation golang.org/x/cry...@v0.31.0 enforces the property that, when successfully authenticating via public key, the last key passed to ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback will be the key used to authenticate the connection. PublicKeyCallback will now be called multiple times with the same key, if necessary. Note that the client may still not control the last key passed to PublicKeyCallback if the connection is then authenticated with a different method, such as PasswordCallback, KeyboardInteractiveCallback, or NoClientAuth. Users should be using the Extensions field of the Permissions return value from the various authentication callbacks to record data associated with the authentication attempt instead of referencing external state. Once the connection is established the state corresponding to the successful authentication attempt can be retrieved via the ServerConn.Permissions field. Note that some third-party libraries misuse the Permissions type by sharing it across authentication attempts; users of third-party libraries should refer to the relevant projects for guidance.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record

Tracking

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Advisories

Source ID Title
Github GHSA Github GHSA GHSA-v778-237x-gjrc Misuse of ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback may cause authorization bypass in golang.org/x/crypto
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7839-1 Go Cryptography vulnerability
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-7839-2 Google Guest Agent vulnerability
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics epss

{'score': 0.36067}

 epss

{'score': 0.3193}
Type Values Removed Values Added
CPEs cpe:/a:redhat:openshift:4.19::el9
Type Values Removed Values Added
CPEs cpe:/a:redhat:openshift_data_foundation:4.14::el9
Type Values Removed Values Added
CPEs cpe:/a:redhat:openshift_data_foundation:4.15::el9
Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Redhat openshift Gitops
CPEs cpe:/a:redhat:openshift_gitops:1.14::el8
Vendors & Products Redhat openshift Gitops
Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Redhat openshift Pipelines
CPEs cpe:/a:redhat:openshift_pipelines:1.18::el9
Vendors & Products Redhat openshift Pipelines
Type Values Removed Values Added
CPEs cpe:/a:redhat:openshift_ai:2.18::el8
cpe:/a:redhat:openshift_data_foundation:4.18::el9
Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Redhat openshift Data Foundation
CPEs cpe:/a:redhat:openshift:4.18::el9
cpe:/a:redhat:openshift_data_foundation:4.16::el9
cpe:/a:redhat:openshift_data_foundation:4.17::el9
Vendors & Products Redhat openshift Data Foundation
Type Values Removed Values Added
CPEs cpe:/a:redhat:openshift:4.14::el8
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Applications and libraries which misuse the ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback callback may be susceptible to an authorization bypass. The documentation for ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback says that "A call to this function does not guarantee that the key offered is in fact used to authenticate." Specifically, the SSH protocol allows clients to inquire about whether a public key is acceptable before proving control of the corresponding private key. PublicKeyCallback may be called with multiple keys, and the order in which the keys were provided cannot be used to infer which key the client successfully authenticated with, if any. Some applications, which store the key(s) passed to PublicKeyCallback (or derived information) and make security relevant determinations based on it once the connection is established, may make incorrect assumptions. For example, an attacker may send public keys A and B, and then authenticate with A. PublicKeyCallback would be called only twice, first with A and then with B. A vulnerable application may then make authorization decisions based on key B for which the attacker does not actually control the private key. Since this API is widely misused, as a partial mitigation golang.org/x/cry...@v0.31.0 enforces the property that, when successfully authenticating via public key, the last key passed to ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback will be the key used to authenticate the connection. PublicKeyCallback will now be called multiple times with the same key, if necessary. Note that the client may still not control the last key passed to PublicKeyCallback if the connection is then authenticated with a different method, such as PasswordCallback, KeyboardInteractiveCallback, or NoClientAuth. Users should be using the Extensions field of the Permissions return value from the various authentication callbacks to record data associated with the authentication attempt instead of referencing external state. Once the connection is established the state corresponding to the successful authentication attempt can be retrieved via the ServerConn.Permissions field. Note that some third-party libraries misuse the Permissions type by sharing it across authentication attempts; users of third-party libraries should refer to the relevant projects for guidance. Applications and libraries which misuse connection.serverAuthenticate (via callback field ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback) may be susceptible to an authorization bypass. The documentation for ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback says that "A call to this function does not guarantee that the key offered is in fact used to authenticate." Specifically, the SSH protocol allows clients to inquire about whether a public key is acceptable before proving control of the corresponding private key. PublicKeyCallback may be called with multiple keys, and the order in which the keys were provided cannot be used to infer which key the client successfully authenticated with, if any. Some applications, which store the key(s) passed to PublicKeyCallback (or derived information) and make security relevant determinations based on it once the connection is established, may make incorrect assumptions. For example, an attacker may send public keys A and B, and then authenticate with A. PublicKeyCallback would be called only twice, first with A and then with B. A vulnerable application may then make authorization decisions based on key B for which the attacker does not actually control the private key. Since this API is widely misused, as a partial mitigation golang.org/x/cry...@v0.31.0 enforces the property that, when successfully authenticating via public key, the last key passed to ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback will be the key used to authenticate the connection. PublicKeyCallback will now be called multiple times with the same key, if necessary. Note that the client may still not control the last key passed to PublicKeyCallback if the connection is then authenticated with a different method, such as PasswordCallback, KeyboardInteractiveCallback, or NoClientAuth. Users should be using the Extensions field of the Permissions return value from the various authentication callbacks to record data associated with the authentication attempt instead of referencing external state. Once the connection is established the state corresponding to the successful authentication attempt can be retrieved via the ServerConn.Permissions field. Note that some third-party libraries misuse the Permissions type by sharing it across authentication attempts; users of third-party libraries should refer to the relevant projects for guidance.
Title Misuse of ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback may cause authorization bypass in golang.org/x/crypto Misuse of connection.serverAuthenticate may cause authorization bypass in golang.org/x/crypto
Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Redhat openshift Ai
CPEs cpe:/a:redhat:advanced_cluster_security:4.4::el8
cpe:/a:redhat:openshift_ai:2.17::el8
Vendors & Products Redhat openshift Ai
Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Redhat gatekeeper
CPEs cpe:/a:redhat:gatekeeper:3.14::el9
cpe:/a:redhat:gatekeeper:3.15::el9
cpe:/a:redhat:gatekeeper:3.17::el9
Vendors & Products Redhat gatekeeper
Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Redhat
Redhat acm
Redhat advanced Cluster Security
Redhat cert Manager
Redhat multicluster Engine
Redhat multicluster Globalhub
Redhat openshift
Redhat openshift Devspaces
Redhat openshift Distributed Tracing
Redhat trusted Artifact Signer
Redhat trusted Profile Analyzer
CPEs cpe:/a:redhat:acm:2.10::el9
cpe:/a:redhat:acm:2.11::el9
cpe:/a:redhat:acm:2.12::el9
cpe:/a:redhat:acm:2.9::el8
cpe:/a:redhat:advanced_cluster_security:4.5::el8
cpe:/a:redhat:cert_manager:1.15::el9
cpe:/a:redhat:multicluster_engine:2.4::el8
cpe:/a:redhat:multicluster_engine:2.5::el8
cpe:/a:redhat:multicluster_engine:2.6::el8
cpe:/a:redhat:multicluster_engine:2.6::el9
cpe:/a:redhat:multicluster_engine:2.7::el8
cpe:/a:redhat:multicluster_engine:2.7::el9
cpe:/a:redhat:multicluster_globalhub:1.2::el9
cpe:/a:redhat:multicluster_globalhub:1.3::el9
cpe:/a:redhat:openshift:4.14::el9
cpe:/a:redhat:openshift:4.15::el9
cpe:/a:redhat:openshift:4.16::el9
cpe:/a:redhat:openshift:4.17::el9
cpe:/a:redhat:openshift_devspaces:3::el9
cpe:/a:redhat:openshift_distributed_tracing:3.4::el8
cpe:/a:redhat:trusted_artifact_signer:1.1::el9
cpe:/a:redhat:trusted_profile_analyzer:1.2::el9
Vendors & Products Redhat
Redhat acm
Redhat advanced Cluster Security
Redhat cert Manager
Redhat multicluster Engine
Redhat multicluster Globalhub
Redhat openshift
Redhat openshift Devspaces
Redhat openshift Distributed Tracing
Redhat trusted Artifact Signer
Redhat trusted Profile Analyzer
Type Values Removed Values Added
References
Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-285
References
Metrics threat_severity

None

 threat_severity

Important
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Applications and libraries which misuse the ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback callback may be susceptible to an authorization bypass. Applications and libraries which misuse the ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback callback may be susceptible to an authorization bypass. The documentation for ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback says that "A call to this function does not guarantee that the key offered is in fact used to authenticate." Specifically, the SSH protocol allows clients to inquire about whether a public key is acceptable before proving control of the corresponding private key. PublicKeyCallback may be called with multiple keys, and the order in which the keys were provided cannot be used to infer which key the client successfully authenticated with, if any. Some applications, which store the key(s) passed to PublicKeyCallback (or derived information) and make security relevant determinations based on it once the connection is established, may make incorrect assumptions. For example, an attacker may send public keys A and B, and then authenticate with A. PublicKeyCallback would be called only twice, first with A and then with B. A vulnerable application may then make authorization decisions based on key B for which the attacker does not actually control the private key. Since this API is widely misused, as a partial mitigation golang.org/x/cry...@v0.31.0 enforces the property that, when successfully authenticating via public key, the last key passed to ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback will be the key used to authenticate the connection. PublicKeyCallback will now be called multiple times with the same key, if necessary. Note that the client may still not control the last key passed to PublicKeyCallback if the connection is then authenticated with a different method, such as PasswordCallback, KeyboardInteractiveCallback, or NoClientAuth. Users should be using the Extensions field of the Permissions return value from the various authentication callbacks to record data associated with the authentication attempt instead of referencing external state. Once the connection is established the state corresponding to the successful authentication attempt can be retrieved via the ServerConn.Permissions field. Note that some third-party libraries misuse the Permissions type by sharing it across authentication attempts; users of third-party libraries should refer to the relevant projects for guidance.
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 9.1, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N'}

ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'yes', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'total'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}
Type Values Removed Values Added
References
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Applications and libraries which misuse the ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback callback may be susceptible to an authorization bypass.
Title Misuse of ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback may cause authorization bypass in golang.org/x/crypto
References
Earlier changes (14)
Weaknesses

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
Go
Published
Updated
Feb 18, 2025, 8:48 PM
Reserved
Aug 27, 2024, 7:41 PM

View source JSON

Updated
Jan 31, 2025, 3:02 PM

JSON

Status
Deferred
Published
Dec 12, 2024, 2:02 AM
Modified
Jun 17, 2026, 7:54 AM

View source JSON

Severity
Important
Public date
Dec 11, 2024, 6:55 PM

View source Bugzilla JSON

No data.