Denial of service in quinn-proto when using `Endpoint::retry()`
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| quinn-rs | quinn | affected |
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No data.
No data available yet.
| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
EUVD |
EUVD-2024-2878 | Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `retry()` on an unvalidated connection exposes the server to a likely panic in the following situations: 1. Calling `refuse` or `ignore` on the resulting validated connection, if a duplicate initial packet is received. This issue can go undetected until a server's `refuse()`/`ignore()` code path is exercised, such as to stop a denial of service attack. 2. Accepting when the initial packet for the resulting validated connection fails to decrypt or exhausts connection IDs, if a similar initial packet that successfully decrypts and doesn't exhaust connection IDs is received. This issue can go undetected if clients are well-behaved. The former situation was observed in a real application, while the latter is only theoretical. |
Github GHSA |
GHSA-vr26-jcq5-fjj8 | Denial of service in quinn-proto when using `Endpoint::retry()` |
No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.568% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Quinn Project
Quinn Project quinn |
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| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:quinn_project:quinn:*:*:*:*:*:rust:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Quinn Project
Quinn Project quinn |
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| Metrics |
ssvc
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `retry()` on an unvalidated connection exposes the server to a likely panic in the following situations: 1. Calling `refuse` or `ignore` on the resulting validated connection, if a duplicate initial packet is received. This issue can go undetected until a server's `refuse()`/`ignore()` code path is exercised, such as to stop a denial of service attack. 2. Accepting when the initial packet for the resulting validated connection fails to decrypt or exhausts connection IDs, if a similar initial packet that successfully decrypts and doesn't exhaust connection IDs is received. This issue can go undetected if clients are well-behaved. The former situation was observed in a real application, while the latter is only theoretical. | |
| Title | Denial of service in quinn-proto when using `Endpoint::retry()` | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-670 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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