pf incorrectly handles multiple IPv6 fragment headers
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
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| FreeBSD | FreeBSD | unknown |
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Configuration 1 [-]
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No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.802% probability within 30 days)
Key SSVC decision points have not yet been added.
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epss
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epss
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| Description | In pf packet processing with a 'scrub fragment reassemble' rule, a packet containing multiple IPv6 fragment headers would be reassembled, and then immediately processed. That is, a packet with multiple fragment extension headers would not be recognized as the correct ultimate payload. Instead a packet with multiple IPv6 fragment headers would unexpectedly be interpreted as a fragmented packet, rather than as whatever the real payload is. As a result, IPv6 fragments may bypass pf firewall rules written on the assumption all fragments have been reassembled and, as a result, be forwarded or processed by the host. | In pf packet processing with a 'scrub fragment reassemble' rule, a packet containing multiple IPv6 fragment headers would be reassembled, and then immediately processed. That is, a packet with multiple fragment extension headers would not be recognized as the correct ultimate payload. Instead a packet with multiple IPv6 fragment headers would unexpectedly be interpreted as a fragmented packet, rather than as whatever the real payload is. As a result, IPv6 fragments may bypass pf firewall rules written on the assumption all fragments have been reassembled and, as a result, be forwarded or processed by the host. |