Command Injection in Cocos Engine workflow
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| cocos | cocos-engine | affected |
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No data.
No data available yet.
| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
EUVD |
EUVD-2023-30293 | Cocos Engine is an open-source framework for building 2D & 3D real-time rendering and interactive content. In the github repo for Cocos Engine the `web-interface-check.yml` was subject to command injection. The `web-interface-check.yml` was triggered when a pull request was opened or updated and contained the user controllable field `(${{ github.head_ref }} – the name of the fork’s branch)`. This would allow an attacker to take over the GitHub Runner and run custom commands (potentially stealing secrets such as GITHUB_TOKEN) and altering the repository. The workflow has since been removed for the repository. There are no actions required of users. |
No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: 2.9% (2.907% probability within 30 days)
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