Jackson Configuration Allows Code Execution with Unknown "Serialization Gadgets"
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Spring by VMware | Spring Batch | affected |
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Configuration 1 [-]
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No data available yet.
| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
EUVD |
EUVD-2022-2414 | When configured to enable default typing, Jackson contained a deserialization vulnerability that could lead to arbitrary code execution. Jackson fixed this vulnerability by blacklisting known "deserialization gadgets". Spring Batch configures Jackson with global default typing enabled which means that through the previous exploit, arbitrary code could be executed if all of the following is true: * Spring Batch's Jackson support is being leveraged to serialize a job's ExecutionContext. * A malicious user gains write access to the data store used by the JobRepository (where the data to be deserialized is stored). In order to protect against this type of attack, Jackson prevents a set of untrusted gadget classes from being deserialized. Spring Batch should be proactive against blocking unknown "deserialization gadgets" when enabling default typing. |
Github GHSA |
GHSA-4ph4-q9r5-6wm6 | Deserialization of Untrusted Data in Spring Batch |
No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: 1.7% (1.712% probability within 30 days)
Key SSVC decision points have not yet been added.
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Broadcom
Broadcom spring Batch |
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| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:broadcom:spring_batch:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Pivotal Software
Pivotal Software spring Batch |
Broadcom
Broadcom spring Batch |