nautilus: Insufficient validation of trust of .desktop files with execute permission
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| n/a | n/a | affected |
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Configuration 1 [-]
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Configuration 2 [-]
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| Package | CPE | Advisory | Released Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 | |||
| nautilus-0:3.22.3-4.el7_4 | cpe:/o:redhat:enterprise_linux:7 | RHSA-2018:0223 | 2018-01-25T00:00:00Z |
No data available yet.
| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
Debian DSA |
DSA-3994-1 | nautilus security update |
EUVD |
EUVD-2017-6105 | GNOME Nautilus before 3.23.90 allows attackers to spoof a file type by using the .desktop file extension, as demonstrated by an attack in which a .desktop file's Name field ends in .pdf but this file's Exec field launches a malicious "sh -c" command. In other words, Nautilus provides no UI indication that a file actually has the potentially unsafe .desktop extension; instead, the UI only shows the .pdf extension. One (slightly) mitigating factor is that an attack requires the .desktop file to have execute permission. The solution is to ask the user to confirm that the file is supposed to be treated as a .desktop file, and then remember the user's answer in the metadata::trusted field. |
No CVSS v4.0
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: 2.5% (2.471% probability within 30 days)
Key SSVC decision points have not yet been added.
No history.