WebDyne versions from 2.031 before 3.022 for Perl execute files with .psp anywhere in the name as Perl pages

WebDyne versions from 2.031 before 3.022 for Perl execute files with .psp anywhere in the name as Perl pages. WebDyne decides whether to run a requested file as a page by matching its name against WEBDYNE_PSP_EXT_RE, which has no end anchor. An application that accepts uploads by checking only the final extension lets a remote attacker upload a file such as report.psp.pdf and run its embedded Perl by requesting it.

tinyauth before 5.1.3 allows rule bypass by appending an allowed route string. This is caused by an unanchored regular expression.

UDP adapter sends ack to attacker-supplied host:port parsed from packet body, even when acknowledge=false

An unauthenticated remote attacker who can send a single UDP packet to a Spring Integration UDP inbound adapter can cause the server to emit an outbound UDP datagram to an arbitrary internal or external host and port of the attacker's choosing. Spring Integration 7.1.0 Spring Integration 7.0.0 - 7.0.5 Spring Integration 6.5.0 - 6.5.10 Spring Integration 6.4.0 - 6.4.12 Spring Integration 5.5.21 and earlier

Webmin information disclosure via regex pattern

Webmin allows unauthenticated attackers to read the contents of any file ending in .conf within module directories, due to a bypassable regex pattern.

SSRF Vulnerability in ntfy Push Endpoint Validation

ntfy before 2.22.0 allows SSRF because of an unanchored regular expression for web push endpoint URLs.

Apache Traffic Server: Regex mappings match with malicious domain names

Regular Expression without Anchors vulnerability in Apache Traffic Server. This issue affects Apache Traffic Server: from 10.0.X through 10.1.3, from 9.0.X through 9.2.14. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 9.2.15 or 10.1.4, which fixes the issue.

jupyter-server CORS origin validation bypass via unanchored regex in allow_origin_pat

Jupyter Server is the backend for Jupyter web applications. In versions 2.17.0 and earlier, the Origin header validation uses Python's re.match() to check incoming origins against the allow_origin_pat configuration value. Because re.match() only anchors at the start of the string and does not require a full match, a pattern intended to match only a trusted domain (e.g., trusted.example.com) will also match any origin that begins with that domain followed by additional characters (e.g., trusted.example.com.evil.com). An attacker who controls such a domain can bypass the CORS origin restriction and make cross-origin requests to the Jupyter Server API from an untrusted site. This issue has been fixed in version 2.18.0.