Insecure Permissions vulnerability in Forescout SecureConnector v.11.3.06.0063 allows a local attacker to escalate privileges via the Recheck Compliance Status component.

Abuse of Unauthenticated Compliance Recheck in SecureConnector

A vulnerability in Forescout SecureConnector v11.3.07.0109 on Windows allows unauthenticated user to modify compliance scripts due to insecure temporary directory.

Denial of Service in Forescout SecureConnector

Denial of Service in Forescout SecureConnector 11.1.02.1019 on Windows allows Unprivileged user to corrupt the configuration file and cause Denial of Service in the application.

Remote Code Execution in Windows Secure Connector/ HPS Inspection Engine via Insecure Named Pipe Access

A remote code execution vulnerability exists in the Windows agent component of SecureConnector due to improper access controls on a named pipe. The pipe is accessible to the Everyone group and does not restrict remote connections, allowing any network-based attacker to connect without authentication. By interacting with this pipe, an attacker can redirect the agent to communicate with a rogue server that can issue commands via the SecureConnector Agent.  This does not impact Linux or OSX Secure Connector.

ForeScout NAC SecureConnector – CWE-427: Uncontrolled Search Path Element

ForeScout NAC SecureConnector version 11.2 - CWE-427: Uncontrolled Search Path Element

ForeScout - SecureConnector Local Service DoS

ForeScout - SecureConnector Local Service DoS - A low privilaged user which doesn't have permissions to shutdown the secure connector service writes a large amount of characters in the installationPath. This will cause the buffer to overflow and override the stack cookie causing the service to crash.

On Windows endpoints, the SecureConnector agent is vulnerable to privilege escalation whereby an authenticated unprivileged user can obtain administrator privileges on the endpoint because files are created in a folder with incorrect privileges

On Windows endpoints, the SecureConnector agent must run under the local SYSTEM account or another administrator account in order to enable full functionality of the agent. The typical configuration is for the agent to run as a Windows service under the local SYSTEM account. The SecureConnector agent runs various plugin scripts and executables on the endpoint in order to gather and report information about the host to the CounterACT management appliance. The SecureConnector agent downloads these scripts and executables as needed from the CounterACT management appliance and runs them on the endpoint. By default, these executable files are downloaded to and run from the %TEMP% directory of the currently logged on user, despite the fact that the SecureConnector agent is running as SYSTEM. Aside from the downloaded scripts, the SecureConnector agent runs a batch file with SYSTEM privileges from the temp directory of the currently logged on user. If the naming convention of this script can be derived, which is made possible by placing it in a directory to which the user has read access, it may be possible overwrite the legitimate batch file with a malicious one before SecureConnector executes it. It is possible to change this directory by setting the the configuration property config.script_run_folder.value in the local.properties configuration file on the CounterACT management appliance, however the batch file which is run does not follow this property.

On Windows endpoints, the SecureConnector agent is vulnerable to privilege escalation whereby an authenticated unprivileged user can obtain administrator privileges on the endpoint because it fails to set any permissions on downloaded file objects

On Windows endpoints, the SecureConnector agent must run under the local SYSTEM account or another administrator account in order to enable full functionality of the agent. The typical configuration is for the agent to run as a Windows service under the local SYSTEM account. The SecureConnector agent runs various plugin scripts and executables on the endpoint in order to gather and report information about the host to the CounterACT management appliance. The SecureConnector agent downloads these scripts and executables as needed from the CounterACT management appliance and runs them on the endpoint. The SecureConnector agent fails to set any permissions on downloaded file objects. This allows a malicious user to take ownership of any of these files and make modifications to it, regardless of where the files are saved. These files are then executed under SYSTEM privileges. A malicious unprivileged user can overwrite these executable files with malicious code before the SecureConnector agent executes them, causing the malicious code to be run under the SYSTEM account.