kernel: accepting plaintext data frames in protected networks

An issue was discovered in the ALFA Windows 10 driver 6.1316.1209 for AWUS036H. The WEP, WPA, WPA2, and WPA3 implementations accept plaintext frames in a protected Wi-Fi network. An adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary data frames independent of the network configuration.

kernel: wifi frame payload being parsed incorrectly as an L2 frame

The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS header field is authenticated. Against devices that support receiving non-SSP A-MSDU frames (which is mandatory as part of 802.11n), an adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary network packets.

Affected devices use a weak encryption scheme to encrypt the debug zip file. This could allow an authenticated attacker to decrypt the contents of the file and retrieve debug information about the system.

Affected devices store the CLI user passwords encrypted in flash memory. Attackers with physical access to the device could retrieve the file and decrypt the CLI user passwords.

Unspecified vulnerability in the command-line management interface on Siemens Scalance W7xx devices with firmware before 4.5.4 allows remote attackers to bypass authentication and execute arbitrary code via a (1) SSH or (2) TELNET connection.

Siemens Scalance W7xx devices with firmware before 4.5.4 use the same hardcoded X.509 certificate across different customers' installations, which makes it easier for remote attackers to conduct man-in-the-middle attacks against SSL sessions by leveraging the certificate's trust relationship.

Affected devices do not check the TFTP blocksize correctly. This could allow an authenticated attacker to read from an uninitialized buffer that potentially contains previously allocated data.