Local Code Execution via id_service.exe in IDrive Backup for Windows

An issue in IDrive IDrive Backup for Windows Version 7.0.1.1 and below affected, remediated in Version 7.0.1.2 allows a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via the id_service.exe component

An issue in IDrive IDrive Backup for Windows Version 7.0.1.1 and below affected, remediated in Version 7.0.1.2 allows a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via the id_service.exe component

IDrive Cloud Backup Client for Windows contains a privilege escalation vulnerability

In versions before 7.0.0.64, IDrive’s id_service.exe process runs with elevated privileges and regularly reads from several files under the C:\ProgramData\IDrive\ directory. The UTF16-LE encoded contents of these files are used as arguments for starting a process, but they can be edited by any standard user logged into the system. An attacker can overwrite or edit the files to specify a path to an arbitrary executable, which will then be executed by the id_service.exe process with SYSTEM privileges.

IDrive before 6.7.3.19 on Windows installs by default to %PROGRAMFILES(X86)%\IDriveWindows with weak folder permissions granting any user modify permission (i.e., NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users:(OI)(CI)(M)) to the contents of the directory and its sub-folders. In addition, the program installs a service called IDriveService that runs as LocalSystem. Thus, any standard user can escalate privileges to NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM by substituting the service's binary with a malicious one.