kernel: accepting plaintext data frames in protected networks

An issue was discovered in the ALFA Windows 10 driver 6.1316.1209 for AWUS036H. The WEP, WPA, WPA2, and WPA3 implementations accept plaintext frames in a protected Wi-Fi network. An adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary data frames independent of the network configuration.

kernel: Forwarding EAPOL from unauthenticated wifi client

An issue was discovered in the kernel in NetBSD 7.1. An Access Point (AP) forwards EAPOL frames to other clients even though the sender has not yet successfully authenticated to the AP. This might be abused in projected Wi-Fi networks to launch denial-of-service attacks against connected clients and makes it easier to exploit other vulnerabilities in connected clients.

A vulnerability in the handling of encrypted wireless frames of Cisco Aironet Access Point (AP) Software could allow an unauthenticated, adjacent attacker to cause a denial of service (DoS) condition on the affected device. This vulnerability is due to incomplete cleanup of resources when dropping certain malformed frames. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by connecting as a wireless client to an affected AP and sending specific malformed frames over the wireless connection. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause degradation of service to other clients, which could potentially lead to a complete DoS condition.

kernel: Reassembling fragments encrypted under different keys

The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that all fragments of a frame are encrypted under the same key. An adversary can abuse this to decrypt selected fragments when another device sends fragmented frames and the WEP, CCMP, or GCMP encryption key is periodically renewed.