ipc: drop the mqueue mount with kern_unmount() on setup failure

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipc: drop the mqueue mount with kern_unmount() on setup failure mq_init_ns() creates the mqueue mount with fc_mount_longterm(), so its ->mnt_ns is MNT_NS_INTERNAL. When setting up the mqueue or ipc sysctls or msg_init_ns() fails afterwards, create_ipc_ns() drops it with a plain mntput(). With ->mnt_ns set that takes the fast path of mntput_no_expire(). The count drops to zero and nothing ever kills the mount, so the mount and the mqueue superblock are leaked. Commit dc55e35f9e81 ("ipc: Store mqueue sysctls in the ipc namespace") added the first failure path after mq_init_ns() and never dropped the mount. Commit 7229d74e5e8c ("ipc: create_ipc_ns: drop mqueue mount on sysctl setup failure") tried to fix that with a mntput() but that doesn't help for a long-term mount. Use kern_unmount(). free_ipc() open-codes the same thing for a namespace that made it.

net: team: free skb when broadcast has no txable port

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: team: free skb when broadcast has no txable port bc_transmit() sends the original skb through the last txable port. When no port is txable, it returns false without consuming the skb, but team_xmit() still returns NETDEV_TX_OK. AF_PACKET sends then retain the skb and its socket write-memory charge. A TX-enabled, link-down port keeps the broadcast transmit op installed. Carrier can stay up through a second link-up, TX-disabled port or be forced on by userspace. Free the original skb on the no-port path while leaving the existing drop accounting intact. Discovered by Sashiko during review of previous commit.

namespace: check a recursive bind mount for mount namespace loops

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: namespace: check a recursive bind mount for mount namespace loops do_loopback() refuses to bind mount the file of a mount namespace that is as old as the caller's or older because a mount namespace that holds a mount of its own file, or of an ancestor's, would cause a cycle. But it only checks the dentry the bind mount starts from. With MS_REC everything below it is copied and do_loopback() passes CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE so mount namespace files below the source are copied. That's fine for a source in the caller's own mount namespace. Every mount namespace file in there passed the same check when it was bind-mounted. It isn't fine for a source in another mount namespace. may_copy_tree() accepts a bind mount of any nsfs or pidfs file no matter what mount namespace it lives in so that /proc/<pid>/ns/<ns> and pidfds can be bind mounted. If we create a bind-mount stack of mount namespaces file descriptors the kernel will copy them irrespective of their ancestoral relationship to the mount namespace in question: 151 146 0:7 net:[4026531833] /tmp/nrc/y rw - nsfs nsfs rw 152 151 0:7 mnt:[4026532293] /tmp/nrc/y rw - nsfs nsfs rw Mount 152 is a mount of the mount namespace file of mount namespace 4026532293 inside mount namespace 4026532293. That namespace and every mount in it are leaked... All it takes is a process in an older mount namespace that stacks the file and repeating it leaks without limit: after control: Shmem: 380 kB child: mount(/proc/self/fd/6, MS_BIND|MS_REC): ok after cycle: Shmem: 65916 kB do_move_mount() runs check_for_nsfs_mounts() over a detached tree for exactly that reason. Do the same for the copy before it is grafted.

net: gso: limit recursive IP-in-IP segmentation

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: gso: limit recursive IP-in-IP segmentation IP-in-IP GSO can re-enter inet_gso_segment() or ipv6_gso_segment() for each nested IP header. encap_level tracks header bytes, not callback depth, so a deep chain can exhaust the kernel stack. Making inet_gso_segment() stackable introduced unbounded IPv4 nesting; IPIP GSO/TSO later made the path reachable. The IPv6 stackable path was introduced separately and uses the same guard. Count IPv4 and IPv6 GSO handler entries in skb_gso_cb, initialized once per top-level GSO operation and preserved across GRE/UDP context changes. Use the existing IP_TUNNEL_RECURSION_LIMIT for both handlers. The first five entries pass, and the sixth returns -EINVAL before dispatching another GSO callback.

Improper release of expired privileged access checkouts in the PAM scheduled check-in task in Devolutions Server 2025.3.2.0 through 2026.2.22.0 allows an authenticated user with checkout rights on a PAM account to retain access to that account on the target system after the checkout expires via a backlog of 21 or more newer active checkouts that prevents the expired checkout from being checked in and its password from being rotated.

pgEdge RAG Server unbounded corpus read allows resource exhaustion from unauthenticated requests

pgEdge RAG Server is an API server for retrieval-augmented generation over PostgreSQL content using pgvector. Prior to 2.0.0, the unauthenticated query endpoint uses FetchDocuments in internal/database/search.go to read the entire filtered corpus without a LIMIT and rebuild an in-memory BM25 index on every request. Because HybridEnabled is set by default in internal/config/loader.go and the endpoint has no rate limit, inexpensive remote queries can impose database and CPU work proportional to corpus size and exhaust service resources. This issue is fixed in version 2.0.0.

bentoml OpenLLM Model Repository Directory Name common.py async_run_command command injection

A vulnerability was found in bentoml OpenLLM 0.6.30. This affects the function async_run_command of the file src/openllm/common.py of the component Model Repository Directory Name Handler. Performing a manipulation of the argument cmd results in command injection. Attacking locally is a requirement. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.

Apache OFBiz: Denial of Service via unauthenticated userTenantId in multitenant mode

In multitenant deployments, ContextFilter and LoginWorker built a per-tenant delegator name from a request-supplied userTenantId parameter and requested a delegator for it before confirming the tenant existed. DelegatorFactory's internal cache retains every delegator name it is asked to resolve, including ones that fail to resolve, so an unauthenticated attacker could submit a stream of arbitrary tenant IDs to grow this cache without bound, driving unnecessary memory and database load.

Uncontrolled XML entity expansion in the Flock Installer app for Android

An uncontrolled XML entity expansion vulnerability in the Flock Installer app for Android before version 2.35.0 allows an attacker who has a valid technician account and controls or impersonates the camera being set up to crash the app, on devices running Android 10, 11 or 12, by returning a camera configuration response that contains nested XML entity declarations. The vulnerability does not allow the attacker to read or change data on the device, and no customer license plate, video or location data is exposed. Android 13 and later reject the response. The issue is fixed in version 2.35.0; update to 2.35.0 or later.

In Eclipse Kura versions 5.4.0 through 5.6.2, the Service Listing V1 REST API read the JSON body of every request into memory, with no limit on its size. The endpoints parse the body before they check whether the caller is authenticated. A remote attacker without valid credentials can therefore send a few dozen large JSON requests at the same time, exhaust the Java heap with an `OutOfMemoryError`, and cause a denial of service. Likewise, a remote attacker, can send a deeply nested JSON request and trigger a `StackOverflowError` because of an unbound recursion in Service Listing V1.

In Eclipse Kura version 5.0.0 to 5.6.2, the Web Console allocates a new HTTP session for every request to its built-in authentication endpoints (/admin/auth, /admin/login/password, /admin/login/cert) before checking the HTTP method, parsing the request, or validating any submitted credentials, and does not limit how many such sessions can be allocated. An unauthenticated client that sends requests to these endpoints without honoring the returned session cookie can cause the server to allocate an unbounded number of sessions, exhausting the JVM heap and crashing the Kura process.

Apache TomEE: DoS via unbounded request body and multipart handling in embedded HTTP server

The embedded OpenEJB HTTP server does not limit the size of incoming request bodies or of multipart requests, and does not remove the temporary files it creates for multipart parts. A remote unauthenticated attacker can cause excessive memory or disk usage, leading to denial of service. Deployments using the Tomcat connectors are not affected. Users are recommended to block network access to the embedded HTTP server from untrusted clients, or to migrate to the Tomcat based TomEE distributions.

Apache James: Denial of service upon MIME parsing

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in Apache James Mime4J library prior version 0.8.15 allows Denial of Service upon parsing Mime messages. Users are recommended to upgrade to Apache James server 3.9.1 that relies on fixed MIME4J 0.8.15 which addresses the issue. See CVE-2026-85108 in Apache James MIME4J library.

Authenticated remote denial of service through unbounded zlib decompression in storeAnalysisStatistics

When an operator enables store.analysis_statistics_dir, a network client with PRODUCT_STORE permission for a product can call that product's storeAnalysisStatistics Thrift-over-HTTP method. CodeChecker 6.29.0 decodes the attacker-controlled Base64 string and passes the complete compressed input to one-shot zlib.decompress(). No maximum decompressed size is enforced. This gives a correctly authorized, non-superuser store account a high-ratio memory and persistent-disk amplification primitive. The complete output is first materialized as a Python bytes object and is then written to the configured statistics directory. A sufficiently scaled payload can exhaust the API worker or host memory and impair CodeChecker availability. The shipped value of store.analysis_statistics_dir is null, so the affected feature is disabled by default. The primary assessment does not rely on authentication being disabled. There is no authorization bypass and no path traversal in this report.

Unbounded request body accumulation on streaming RPCs causes memory exhaustion in grpc_server

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in elixir-grpc grpc_server allows unauthenticated attackers to exhaust memory and crash the node via an oversized client-streaming or bidirectional-streaming request body. The streaming read clause of 'Elixir.GRPC.Server.Adapters.Cowboy.Handler':info/3 (grpc_server/lib/grpc/server/adapters/cowboy/handler.ex) never checks the configured max_body_size. Only the unary read path enforces that cap. 'Elixir.GRPC.Server.Adapters.Cowboy':reading_stream/1 (grpc_server/lib/grpc/server/adapters/cowboy.ex) appends every received chunk to its buffer until a complete length-prefixed message arrives. A client can declare a very large message and send it across many small HTTP/2 DATA frames, and the server buffers all of it. This issue affects grpc_server: from 1.0.0 before 1.0.6.

Cowboy HTTP/1.1 Unbounded Buffering of Pipelined Data During Request Handling Enables Memory Exhaustion

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in ninenines cowboy allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to exhaust connection process memory over HTTP/1.1. Once a request has been received in full and its handler is still running, cowboy_http:parse/2 in src/cowboy_http.erl appends every further byte that arrives on the keep-alive connection to the connection buffer and returns to the receive loop without parsing it. The socket stays in active mode and no limit applies to this buffer: max_request_line_length, max_headers and the other parser limits only take effect once the handler returns and parsing resumes, and the only timer in this state is idle_timeout (default 60 seconds), which is reset on every received chunk. A client can therefore send an arbitrary amount of data on one connection for as long as the handler runs, and a few connections to an endpoint that holds requests open can drive the Erlang VM into out-of-memory conditions. This issue affects cowboy: from 2.18.0 before 2.21.0.

Unbounded decoded HTTP/2 header-list size in cowlib cow_http2_machine enables HPACK amplification memory exhaustion

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in ninenines cowlib allows an unauthenticated remote peer to exhaust the memory of an HTTP/2 endpoint via HPACK-indexed header fields. cow_http2_machine:headers_decode/4 in src/cow_http2_machine.erl decodes every HEADERS block with cow_hpack:decode/3. It bounds the compressed block size and the number of fields, but not the size of the decoded header list that RFC 9113 section 6.5.2 places under SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE. A peer stores one header value of up to the dynamic table size (4096 bytes by default) and then references it with one-byte indexed fields, so about 100 bytes on the wire decode to a header list of about 390 KB. A consumer that copies the decoded values, as Cowboy does when cowboy_http2:headers_to_map/2 joins repeated cookie fields into one binary, allocates that amount for every stream. The total across streams and connections is not bounded. This issue affects cowlib: from 2.7.0 before 2.22.0.

Eclipse Kura downloads deployment packages (DPs) from a remote URL without any limit on the size of the data it receives. A malicious or compromised HTTP(S) server, or an attacker able to tamper with a plain-HTTP download, can stream an arbitrarily large (or endless) response. Kura writes the response to local storage until the filesystem is full. On gateways the temporary directory is often a RAM-backed tmpfs, so this can also exhaust memory. The result is denial of service of the device: failed configuration persistence, failed logging and possible crashes of the framework or other services. The same missing size limit is present in the REST upload endpoint `POST /deploy/v2/_upload`, which copies the request body to the temporary directory with no limit. Workarounds: only install DPs from trusted HTTPS sources, restrict who can install packages (Web UI `kura.packages.admin` permission, REST `kura.permission.rest.deploy`, cloud DEPLOY-V2 access).

Excessive Memory Allocation in Relative CRLDP Processing

Issue summary: A certificate with many nameRelativeToCRLIssuer CRL distribution points causes disproportionate heap growth when OpenSSL caches X.509 extensions. Impact summary: Receiving a crafted certificate from a malicious peer can lead to significant memory pressure and possible Denial of Service in clients or in servers that solicit client certificates. CWE: CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling Description: A certificate or a set of certificates that fits under the limit for size of certificates accepted from the peer (~100 KiB) can result in allocation of several hundred MiB of resident memory on the receiving side during a normal TLS handshake. This may be enough to crash the client or server, if multiple concurrent connections lead to similarly large memory allocations. The fix postpones processing of the CRL distribution points extensions in certificates to the time when the processed value is required for CRL processing. This avoids keeping large memory allocations for a long time when such certificates are received. FIPS impact: no The affected code is outside the FIPS module boundary.

jackson-dataformat-cbor: quadratic-time TagList growth on unbounded stacked tags (CPU/GC DoS, PoC)

One CBOR-parsing issue in jackson-dataformats-binary's CBOR module: an unbounded run of CBOR tags drives quadratic-time TagList growth (CPU/GC-exhaustion DoS, PoC-proven). PoC executed against com.fasterxml.jackson.dataformat:jackson-dataformat-cbor:2.18.2; present in current 2.x and 3.x (tools.jackson.dataformat.cbor) HEAD. Distinct from the Avro and Smile/Protobuf advisories for this repo. Quadratic CPU/GC DoS from an unbounded chain of CBOR tags (PoC-proven). File: cbor/src/main/java/.../cbor/CBORParser.java (tag handling -> TagList). CBOR permits a data item to be preceded by any number of semantic tags. The CBOR parser accumulates them in a TagList whose backing array grows by a fixed increment (+8), not by doubling, and re-scans/copies on each growth. An attacker sends a value preceded by a long run of tag bytes; the fixed-increment growth makes accumulating N tags O(N^2) in time (plus GC pressure), with no cap on the number of stacked tags. PoC (executed, JDK 17): feeding a CBOR stream consisting of a long run of tag bytes (e.g. tag 0xC0+) before a trivial value forces quadratic CPU/GC; parse time grows super-linearly with the tag count, pinning a request thread with no configurable limit. Impact. Algorithmic-complexity denial of service (CWE-407): a modest input of stacked tags consumes quadratic CPU/GC, pinning a request thread; concurrent requests exhaust the pool. Fix. Grow TagList by doubling and/or cap the number of stacked tags (StreamReadConstraints-style).