Repository migration SSRF via multi-answer DNS allow-list bypass
Repository migration SSRF via multi-answer DNS allow-list bypass
Repository migration SSRF via multi-answer DNS allow-list bypass
SSRF in restore-repo via unsanitized pull_request.yml Head.CloneURL
Team-repository linking endpoint bypasses the RepoAdminChangeTeamAccess organization setting
Missing Authorization and Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key and Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource and Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor in code.gitea.io/gitea
Token public-only scope bypassed on Limited-visibility owners (Repository + Package categories) — residual after CVE-2026-25714 / PR #37118
Private Repository Metadata Remains Accessible After Access Revocation
RSS/Atom feed handlers bypass API-token scope & public-only confinement (incomplete fix of #37698)
Internal API HTTP client hardcodes InsecureSkipVerify:true with no config override (CWE-295)
OIDC userinfo Endpoint Returns Identity Claims Without Enforcing API Token Scopes
Null Pointer Dereference in AddTime API Causes Authenticated Denial of Service
Private org member list leaked via /members API endpoint — incomplete fix for PR #38145
Public-Only Personal access tokens scope bypass in Organization and Permission Endpoints
Email Management API Bypasses ManageCredentials Feature Restrictions
The GET /api/v1/user/actions/runners/registration-token endpoint (and its owner- and repository-level equivalents) creates a new runner registration token if none exists, yet the API scope middleware classifies it as read-only because it is a GET request. A holder of a leaked read:user-scoped token can therefore mint a registration token and register a malicious Actions runner that executes workflow jobs with access to repository secrets and source code.
Blind SSRF in OAuth2 avatar synchronization via unvalidated OIDC picture claim
Gitea prior to 1.27.0 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows authenticated attackers to bypass SSRF protections by exploiting HTTP fetch operations in migration and OAuth avatar code paths that use Go's default http.Get without a custom DialContext. Attackers can supply arbitrary URLs through release asset download URLs, pull-request patch URLs, or OAuth avatar endpoints to reach internal services, cloud instance-metadata endpoints, or read local files such as the application configuration containing database credentials and signing secrets, with exfiltrated content persisted as migration release assets for later retrieval.
Fork-PR Actions task can read a third private repository via the collaborative-owner branch (missing fork-PR guard)
GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp ClearRepoWatches fix not applied to API EditRepo path — sister code path retains stale watches on public->private