Path Traversal in @backstage/plugin-scaffolder-backend

@backstage/plugin-scaffolder-backend is the backend for the default Backstage software templates. In affected versions a malicious actor with write access to a registered scaffolder template is able to manipulate the template in a way that writes files to arbitrary paths on the scaffolder-backend host instance. This vulnerability can in some situation also be exploited through user input when executing a template, meaning you do not need write access to the templates. This method will not allow the attacker to control the contents of the injected file however, unless the template is also crafted in a specific way that gives control of the file contents. This vulnerability is fixed in version `0.15.14` of the `@backstage/plugin-scaffolder-backend`. This attack is mitigated by restricting access and requiring reviews when registering or modifying scaffolder templates.

Storage bucket Directory Traversal in @backstage/plugin-techdocs-backend

Backstage is an open framework for building developer portals. When using the AWS S3 or GCS storage provider for TechDocs it is possible to access content in the entire storage bucket. This can leak contents of the bucket that are not intended to be accessible, as well as bypass permission checks in Backstage. This has been fixed in the 1.10.13 release of the `@backstage/plugin-techdocs-backend` package. All users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Circumvention of cross site scripting Protection in @backstage/plugin-techdocs-backend

Backstage is an open framework for building developer portals. An attacker with control of the contents of the TechDocs storage buckets is able to inject executable scripts in the TechDocs content that will be executed in the victim's browser when browsing documentation or navigating to an attacker provided link. This has been fixed in the 1.10.13 release of the `@backstage/plugin-techdocs-backend` package. users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Dragonfly2 vulnerable to hard coded cyptographic key

Dragonfly is an open source P2P-based file distribution and image acceleration system. It is hosted by the Cloud Native Computing Foundation (CNCF) as an Incubating Level Project. Dragonfly uses JWT to verify user. However, the secret key for JWT, "Secret Key", is hard coded, which leads to authentication bypass. An attacker can perform any action as a user with admin privileges. This issue has been addressed in release version 2.0.9. All users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Conformance validation endpoint discloses detail about service to unauthenticated users

The conformance validation endpoint is public so everybody can verify the conformance of onboarded services. The response could contain specific information about the service, including available endpoints, and swagger. It could advise about the running version of a service to an attacker. The attacker could also check if a service is running.

Health endpoint offers list of onboarded services to unauthenticated users

The health endpoint is public so everybody can see a list of all services. It is potentially valuable information for attackers.

Insecure sandbox in Backstage Scaffolder plugin

Backstage is an open platform for building developer portals. The Backstage scaffolder-backend plugin uses a templating library that requires sandbox, as it by design allows for code injection. The library used for this sandbox so far has been `vm2`, but in light of several past vulnerabilities and existing vulnerabilities that may not have a fix, the plugin has switched to using a different sandbox library. A malicious actor with write access to a registered scaffolder template could manipulate the template in a way that allows for remote code execution on the scaffolder-backend instance. This was only exploitable in the template YAML definition itself and not by user input data. This is vulnerability is fixed in version 1.15.0 of `@backstage/plugin-scaffolder-backend`.

In Wi-Fi, there is a possible low throughput due to misrepresentation of critical information. This could lead to remote denial of service with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: GN20220829014; Issue ID: GN20220829014.

In wlan firmware, there is possible system crash due to an uncaught exception. This could lead to remote denial of service with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: ALPS07664711; Issue ID: ALPS07664711.

In wlan firmware, there is possible system crash due to an uncaught exception. This could lead to remote denial of service with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: ALPS07664720; Issue ID: ALPS07664720.

In wlan firmware, there is possible system crash due to an integer overflow. This could lead to remote denial of service with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: ALPS07664731; Issue ID: ALPS07664731.

In wlan firmware, there is possible system crash due to an integer overflow. This could lead to remote denial of service with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: ALPS07664735; Issue ID: ALPS07664735.

In wlan firmware, there is possible system crash due to an integer overflow. This could lead to remote denial of service with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: ALPS07664741; Issue ID: ALPS07664741.

Arbitrary File Overwrite in download_model_with_test_data in onnx/onnx

A vulnerability in the `download_model_with_test_data` function of the onnx/onnx framework, version 1.16.0, allows for arbitrary file overwrite due to inadequate prevention of path traversal attacks in malicious tar files. This vulnerability enables attackers to overwrite any file on the system, potentially leading to remote code execution, deletion of system, personal, or application files, thus impacting the integrity and availability of the system. The issue arises from the function's handling of tar file extraction without performing security checks on the paths within the tar file, as demonstrated by the ability to overwrite the `/home/kali/.ssh/authorized_keys` file by specifying an absolute path in the malicious tar file.

SQL Injection in Harbor scan log API

SQL-Injection in Harbor allows priviledge users to leak the task IDs

NATS nats-server before 2.9.23 and 2.10.x before 2.10.2 has an authentication bypass. An implicit $G user in an authorization block can sometimes be used for unauthenticated access, even when the intention of the configuration was for each user to have an account. The earliest affected version is 2.2.0.

Authenticated users can crash the CubeFS servers with maliciously crafted requests

CubeFS is an open-source cloud-native file storage system. A security vulnerability was found in CubeFS HandlerNode in versions prior to 3.3.1 that could allow authenticated users to send maliciously-crafted requests that would crash the ObjectNode and deny other users from using it. The root cause was improper handling of incoming HTTP requests that could allow an attacker to control the ammount of memory that the ObjectNode would allocate. A malicious request could make the ObjectNode allocate more memory that the machine had available, and the attacker could exhaust memory by way of a single malicious request. An attacker would need to be authenticated in order to invoke the vulnerable code with their malicious request and have permissions to delete objects. In addition, the attacker would need to know the names of existing buckets of the CubeFS deployment - otherwise the request would be rejected before it reached the vulnerable code. As such, the most likely attacker is an inside user or an attacker that has breached the account of an existing user in the cluster. The issue has been patched in v3.3.1. There is no other mitigation besides upgrading.

Vault Key Partially Predetermined

Due to the implementation of "deriveVaultKey", prior to version 7.10, the generated vault key would always have the last 16 bytes predetermined to be "arfoobarfoobarfo". This issue happens because "deriveVaultKey" calls "retrieveCloudKey" (which will always return "foobarfoobarfoobarfoobarfoobarfo" as the key), and then merges the 32byte randomly generated key with this key (by takeing 16bytes from each, see "mergeKeys"). This makes the key a lot weaker. This issue does not persist in devices that were initialized on/after version 7.10, but devices that were initialized before that and updated to a newer version still have this issue. Roll an update that enforces the full 32bytes key usage.

Rootfs Not Protected

In EVE OS, the “measured boot” mechanism prevents a compromised device from accessing the encrypted data located in the vault. As per the “measured boot” design, the PCR values calculated at different stages of the boot process will change if any of their respective parts are changed. This includes, among other things, the configuration of the bios, grub, the kernel cmdline, initrd, and more. However, this mechanism does not validate the entire rootfs, so an attacker can edit the filesystem and gain control over the system. As the default filesystem used by EVE OS is squashfs, this is somewhat harder than an ext4, which is easily changeable. This will not stop an attacker, as an attacker can repackage the squashfs with their changes in it and replace the partition altogether. This can also be done directly on the device, as the “003-storage-init” container contains the “mksquashfs” and “unsquashfs” binaries (with the corresponding libs). An attacker can gain full control over the device without changing the PCR values, thus not triggering the “measured boot” mechanism, and having full access to the vault. Note: This issue was partially fixed in these commits (after disclosure to Zededa), where the config partition measurement was added to PCR13: • aa3501d6c57206ced222c33aea15a9169d629141 • 5fef4d92e75838cc78010edaed5247dfbdae1889. This issue was made viable in version 9.0.0 when the calculation was moved to PCR14 but it was not included in the measured boot.

Vault Key Sealed With SHA1 PCRs

Vault Key Sealed With SHA1 PCRs The measured boot solution implemented in EVE OS leans on a PCR locking mechanism. Different parts of the system update different PCR values in the TPM, resulting in a unique value for each PCR entry. These PCRs are then used in order to seal/unseal a key from the TPM which is used to encrypt/decrypt the “vault” directory. This “vault” directory is the most sensitive point in the system and as such, its content should be protected. This mechanism is noted in Zededa’s documentation as the “measured boot” mechanism, designed to protect said “vault”. The code that’s responsible for generating and fetching the key from the TPM assumes that SHA256 PCRs are used in order to seal/unseal the key, and as such their presence is being checked. The issue here is that the key is not sealed using SHA256 PCRs, but using SHA1 PCRs. This leads to several issues: • Machines that have their SHA256 PCRs enabled but SHA1 PCRs disabled, as well as not sealing their keys at all, meaning the “vault” is not protected from an attacker. • SHA1 is considered insecure and reduces the complexity level required to unseal the key in machines which have their SHA1 PCRs enabled. An attacker can very easily retrieve the contents of the “vault”, which will effectively render the “measured boot” mechanism meaningless.