Sandboxie-Plus: Sandbox containment bypass

Sandboxie-Plus is an open source sandbox-based isolation software for Windows. Prior to 1.18.6, a process inside a sandbox could send MSGID_FILE_SET_ATTRIBUTES or MSGID_FILE_SET_SHORT_NAME to SbieSvc and cause the SYSTEM service to open and modify an existing file outside the sandbox. The direct primitive changes file attributes, timestamps, writeability, or 8.3 short names; a short-name redirection can additionally contribute to SYSTEM code execution when a privileged process resolves an attacker-controlled short-name path in a location SbieSvc can open. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.18.6.

Sandboxie-Plus: Sandboxie APC Injection Sandbox Escape

Sandboxie-Plus is an open source sandbox-based isolation software for Windows. Prior to 1.17.6, GuiServer::WndHookRegisterSlave in Sandboxie/core/svc/GuiServer.cpp stores attacker-supplied hthread and hproc fields from a GUI_WND_HOOK_REGISTER request without validating that the thread belongs to the sandboxed process or that the function pointer is in the caller address space, and GuiServer::WndHookNotifySlave then calls OpenThread(THREAD_SET_CONTEXT, FALSE, whk->hthread) and QueueUserAPC((PAPCFUNC)whk->hproc, hThread, (ULONG_PTR)req->threadid) as SYSTEM, allowing a sandboxed process to execute arbitrary code in an unsandboxed host process. This issue is fixed in version 1.17.6.

Sandboxie-Plus EditPassword hash entropy reduced from 160 bits to 80 bits due to incorrect nibble extraction

Sandboxie-Plus is an open source sandbox-based isolation software for Windows. In versions 1.17.2 and earlier, SbieIniServer::HashPassword converts a SHA-1 digest to hexadecimal incorrectly. The high nibble of each byte is shifted right by 8 instead of 4, which always produces zero for an 8-bit value. As a result, the stored EditPassword hash only preserves the low nibble of each digest byte, reducing the effective entropy from 160 bits to 80 bits. This is layered on top of an unsalted SHA-1 scheme. The reduced entropy makes leaked or backed-up password hashes materially easier to brute-force. This issue has been fixed in version 1.17.3.

Sandboxie kernel driver denial of service via malformed IOCTL from sandboxed process

Sandboxie is an open source sandbox-based isolation software for Windows. In versions 1.17.2 and earlier, a local denial of service vulnerability exists in the Sandboxie kernel driver. An unprivileged process running inside a Standard Sandbox can send a malformed IOCTL to the \Device\SandboxieDriverApi driver, triggering an immediate kernel crash (BSOD). The vulnerability affects the Standard Sandbox configuration both with and without dropped administrator privileges, but does not affect the Security Hardened Sandbox configuration. This issue has been fixed in version 1.17.3. Users who cannot update can use the Security Hardened Sandbox configuration as a workaround.

Sandboxie-Plus privilege escalation via INI CRLF injection bypassing EditAdminOnly

Sandboxie-Plus is an open source sandbox-based isolation software for Windows. In versions 1.17.2 and earlier, an INI injection vulnerability allows any standard local user to bypass configuration restrictions (EditAdminOnly and ConfigPassword) and inject arbitrary directives into the global Sandboxie.ini configuration file. The background service skips authorization checks for IPC messages targeting sections beginning with UserSettings_, but does not sanitize CRLF characters in either the value parameter (via MSGID_SBIE_INI_ADD_SETTING) or the setting name parameter (via MSGID_SBIE_INI_SET_SETTING). An attacker can inject a new sandbox section header with unrestricted permissions, enabling sandbox escape and SYSTEM privilege escalation. This issue has been fixed in version 1.17.3.

Sandboxie-Plus sandbox escape via uninitialized memory leak and stack overflow in GetRawInputDeviceInfoSlave

Sandboxie-Plus is an open source sandbox-based isolation software for Windows. In versions 1.17.2 and earlier, the SbieSvc proxy service's GetRawInputDeviceInfoSlave handler contains two vulnerabilities that can be chained for sandbox escape. First, when a sandboxed process sends an IPC request with cbSize set to 0, up to 32KB of uninitialized stack memory from the service process is returned, leaking return addresses and stack cookies which bypass ASLR and /GS protections. Second, the handler performs a memcpy with an attacker-controlled length without verifying it fits within the 32KB stack buffer, enabling a stack buffer overflow. By chaining the information leak with the overflow, a sandboxed process can execute a ROP chain to achieve SYSTEM privilege escalation, even from a Security Hardened Sandbox. Hardware-enforced shadow stacks (Intel CET) prevent the ROP chain execution but do not mitigate the information leak. This issue has been fixed in version 1.17.3.

Sandboxie-Plus SbieIniServer RunSbieCtrl stack buffer overflow allows local privilege escalation

Sandboxie-Plus is an open source sandbox-based isolation software for Windows. In versions 1.17.2 and earlier, the SbieIniServer RunSbieCtrl handler contains a stack buffer overflow. The MSGID_SBIE_INI_RUN_SBIE_CTRL message is handled before normal sandbox and impersonation checks, and for non-sandboxed callers, the handler copies the trailing message payload into a fixed-size WCHAR ctrlCmd[128] stack buffer using memcpy without verifying the length fits within the buffer. The service pipe is created with a NULL DACL, allowing any local interactive process to connect and send an oversized payload to overflow the stack. This can lead to a crash of the SbieSvc service or potential code execution as SYSTEM. This issue has been fixed in version 1.17.3.

Sandboxie-Plus ProcessServer boxname stack buffer overflows via unterminated wide string copy

Sandboxie-Plus is an open source sandbox-based isolation software for Windows. In versions 1.17.2 and earlier, several ProcessServer handlers (KillAllHandler, SuspendAllHandler, and RunSandboxedHandler) copy a WCHAR boxname[34] field from request structures into WCHAR[40] stack buffers using wcscpy without verifying null termination. Because the service pipe accepts variable-length packets larger than the request structure, an attacker can fill the boxname field with non-zero data and append additional controlled wide characters after the structure. wcscpy then reads past the fixed field and overflows the destination stack buffer. The service pipe is created with a NULL DACL, allowing any local process to connect, and the unsafe copy occurs before authorization checks. This can lead to a crash of the SbieSvc service or potential code execution as SYSTEM. This issue has been fixed in version 1.17.3.

Sandboxie-Plus NamedPipeServer OpenHandler stack overflow via unterminated server field

Sandboxie-Plus is an open source sandbox-based isolation software for Windows. In versions 1.17.2 and earlier, NamedPipeServer::OpenHandler copies the server field from NAMED_PIPE_OPEN_REQ into a fixed WCHAR pipename[160] stack buffer using wcscat without verifying null termination. The handler only enforces a minimum packet size, and since the service pipe accepts variable-length messages, a sandboxed caller can fill the server[48] field with non-zero data and append additional controlled wide characters after the structure. wcscat then reads past the fixed field and overflows the stack buffer in the SYSTEM service. This message is restricted to sandboxed callers, making it a sandbox escape vector. This can lead to a crash of the SbieSvc service or potential code execution as SYSTEM. This issue has been fixed in version 1.17.3.

Sandboxie-Plus local privilege escalation via TOCTOU race condition in UpdUtil addon installation

Sandboxie-Plus is an open source sandbox-based isolation software for Windows. In versions 1.17.2 and earlier, a Time-of-Check-to-Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition exists during addon installation. When a user installs an addon through the SandMan interface, UpdUtil.exe is spawned as SYSTEM by SbieSvc but stages files in the user-writable %TEMP%\sandboxie-updater directory. After UpdUtil verifies file hashes against the signed addon manifest, install.bat extracts files.cab and executes config.exe from its contents. Between hash verification and extraction, an unprivileged user can replace files.cab with a crafted cabinet containing a malicious executable, which is then run as SYSTEM. No UAC prompt is required. This issue has been fixed in version 1.17.3.

Sandboxie-Plus 5.50.2 - 'Service SbieSvc' Unquoted Service Path

Sandboxie-Plus 5.50.2 contains an unquoted service path vulnerability in the SbieSvc Windows service that allows local attackers to potentially execute arbitrary code. Attackers can exploit the unquoted binary path to inject malicious executables that will be run with LocalSystem privileges during service startup.

Sandboxie Plus v0.7.2 - 'SbieSvc' Unquoted Service Path

Sandboxie Plus 0.7.2 contains an unquoted service path vulnerability in the SbieSvc service that allows local attackers to execute code with elevated privileges. Attackers can exploit the unquoted binary path to inject malicious executables that will be launched with LocalSystem permissions during service startup.

Sandboxie 5.49.7 - Denial of Service

Sandboxie 5.49.7 contains a denial of service vulnerability that allows attackers to crash the application by overflowing the container folder input field. Attackers can paste a large buffer of repeated characters into the Sandbox container folder setting to trigger an application crash.

Sandboxie 5.30 Denial of Service via Program Alerts Buffer Overflow

Sandboxie 5.30 contains a denial of service vulnerability that allows local attackers to crash the application by supplying an excessively long string in the Program Alerts configuration field. Attackers can paste a buffer of 5000 characters into the 'Select or enter a program' field during program alert configuration to trigger an application crash.

This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority as a duplicate.

Sandboxie's Integer Overflow in SbieIniServer::RC4Crypt allows sandbox escape and SYSTEM compromise

Sandboxie is a sandbox-based isolation software for 32-bit and 64-bit Windows NT-based operating systems. In versions 1.16.6 and below, the SYSTEM-level service SbieSvc.exe exposes SbieIniServer::RC4Crypt to sandboxed processes. The handler adds a fixed header size to a caller-controlled value_len without overflow checking. A large value_len (e.g., 0xFFFFFFF0) wraps the allocation size, causing a heap overflow when attacker data is copied into the undersized buffer. This allows sandboxed processes to execute arbitrary code as SYSTEM, fully compromising the host. This issue is fixed in version 1.16.7.

Sandboxie 5.26 allows a Sandbox Escape via an "import os" statement, followed by os.system("cmd") or os.system("powershell"), within a .py file. NOTE: the vendor disputes this issue because the observed behavior is consistent with the product's intended functionality

Sandboxie exposes encrypted sandbox key during password change

Sandboxie is a sandbox-based isolation software for 32-bit and 64-bit Windows NT-based operating systems. In versions 1.16.1 and below, a critical security vulnerability exists in password handling mechanisms. During encrypted sandbox creation, user passwords are transmitted via shared memory, exposing them to potential interception. The vulnerability is particularly severe during password modification operations, where both old and new passwords are passed as plaintext command-line arguments to the Imbox process without any encryption or obfuscation. This implementation flaw allows any process within the user session, including unprivileged processes, to retrieve these sensitive credentials by reading the command-line arguments, thereby bypassing standard privilege requirements and creating a significant security risk. This is fixed in version 1.16.2.

Sandboxie Arbitrary Kernel Read in SbieDrv.sys API (API_SET_SECURE_PARAM)

Sandboxie is a sandbox-based isolation software for 32-bit and 64-bit Windows NT-based operating systems. Starting in version 1.3.0 and prior to version 1.15.12, Api_SetSecureParam fails to sanitize incoming pointers, and implicitly trusts that the pointer the user has passed in is safe to read from. SetRegValue then reads an arbitrary address, which can be a kernel pointer, into a HKLM Security SBIE registry value. This can later be retrieved by API_GET_SECURE_PARAM. Version 1.15.12 fixes the issue.

Sandboxie Arbitrary Kernel Write in SbieDrv.sys API (API_GET_SECURE_PARAM)

Sandboxie is a sandbox-based isolation software for 32-bit and 64-bit Windows NT-based operating systems. Starting in version 1.3.0 and prior to version 1.15.12, Api_GetSecureParam fails to sanitize incoming pointers, and implicitly trusts that the pointer the user has passed in is safe to write to. GetRegValue then writes the contents of the SBIE registry entry selected to this address. An attacker can pass in a kernel pointer and the driver dumps the registry key contents we requested to it. This can be triggered by anyone on the system, including low integrity windows processes. Version 1.15.12 fixes the issue.